



# ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA'S FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES

SEPTEMBER 2019

A strategic review of the South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission. This analysis, provides guidance towards implementing the Commission's role in leading the governance, strategy and policy aspects of the emergency services, who deliver services for the prevention, control and suppression of fires and certain emergency situations.

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## **INTRODUCTION**

South Australia's emergency services are delivered through its three agencies, the SA Metropolitan Fire Service (SAMFS), the SA Country Fire Service (SACFS) and the SA State Emergency Service (SASES). The South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission (the Commission), as defined in the *Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005*, is established to provide for the governance, strategic and policy aspects of the emergency services. A fourth agency, SAFECOM is established to support the responsibilities of the Chief Executive (CE), of the Commission, for providing enabling support services to the emergency services and leads from a strategic perspective, certain emergency management functions.

The Commission's first priorities are set around the principle of the primacy of life. Its emphasis is on creating systems and cultures that protect the safety and welfare of all Fire and Emergency Services personnel whether they be paid staff or volunteers. Working with government, the Commission sets a program of priorities and is budgeted to provide service delivery against standards of performance, set annually through the budget process.

A high-level analysis of Fire and Emergency Service budget allocation and performance targets has been undertaken through a review of the Productivity Commission's 'Report on Government Services' (ROGS) (Attachment 2). ROGS benchmarks the efficiency and effectiveness of South Australia's Fire and Emergency Services and the data demonstrates South Australia sits 'in the middle' when compared to performance and expenditure with other States and Territories.

The South Australian community is well-served by a dedicated and committed emergency service workforce of both staff and volunteers. It is particularly impressive to observe the commitment of those staff who support volunteers, many of whom are emergency service volunteers themselves.

Equally there is a high level of community support, which acknowledges the importance of South Australia's Fire and Emergency Services. Over successive years funding levels have been able to be maintained and improved. This is evidenced by the high quality equipment, the investment in training and professional development, the standards of communication equipment, vehicles and stations. All of the emergency service agencies have benefited from ongoing investment.

Since March 2018, the Government has provided a range of initiatives including budget measures such as \$2.3m in 2018-19 (\$9.5 million over four years) to the CFS to continue South Australia's involvement with the National Aerial Firefighting Strategy, \$2.5 million in 2018-19 (\$5.0 million over two years) to CFS to support station upgrades through upgrading existing stations. (Attachment 4).

The quality of services provided by firefighters and volunteers is outstanding. There is however, room for improvement. Greater collaboration is required across the fire and emergency services in areas such as planning capital works, procurement decisions, innovation and the use of technology. The changing risk environment continues to place pressure of the effective delivery of services within budgets. Greater collaboration is required to understand and mitigate these risks. The Government expects strong leadership of its emergency services. It has undertaken a process of renewal of the emergency services executive in order to make the needed improvements and bring together the leadership team that is required.

The CE and Chief Officers need to lead by example. They are accountable for delivering the strong leadership that is expected. By setting a strategic direction, modelling the highest professional standards, effectively communicating, consulting and promoting diversity and inclusion they are exhibiting the behaviours that their respective roles necessitate. The functions and powers of the SA Fire and Emergency Services Commission provide the mandate through which the CE and the Chief Officers can effectively deliver the best possible fire and emergency services to the community of South Australia.

This paper is the first step forward in progressing a new strategic direction under the governance framework established under the *Fire and Emergency Services Act, 2005*.

## **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. LEADERSHIP**

Former Chief Executives of SAFECOM and Chief Officers have failed to effectively lead the implementation of fire and emergency management priorities of successive governments since 2005.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **The Chief Executive and Chief Officers need to drive collective leadership, be accountable through their executive contracts and through the development and implementation of an Emergency Services Joint Executive Charter which is agreed to and signed by the Chief Executive SAFECOM, each Chief Officer and the Minister for Emergency Services.**

### **2. GOVERNANCE**

Due to the ineffective use of the powers and functions of the Commission poor governance has stifled collective innovation and improvement.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **Through the establishment of a Joint Executive Charter the Chief Executive and Chief Officers commit as a unified team when presenting at the SAFECOM Board. This will allow government priorities, improvements and changes to be implemented into joint policy.**

### **3. FINANCIAL CONTROL**

The MFS has overspent its budget regularly for the last decade which has a significant impact on the Community Emergency Services Fund and the Emergency Services Levy.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **Outcomes from the recently announced MFS expenditure inquiry to initiate a broader review of service delivery models and capital programs that better balance and align risk to service delivery outcomes and investment decisions.**

### **4. INNOVATION AND PROJECT DELIVERY**

Failure to develop a strategic capital works plan and poor project management has led to delivery delays, increases in the fleet age, a lack of appropriate information management systems, sub-standard control facilities, and support equipment for volunteers and firefighters.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **Develop a 10 year capital works program that identifies priorities to enhance operational performance and meet future risks. Delivery of funded projects to be closely monitored by the SAFECOM Board as the sponsoring authority.**

### **5. POLICY ADVICE AND SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT**

Inadequate development of policy and poor collaboration within as well as across other departments, has led to poor service to government by SAFECOM and the Fire and Emergency Services.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **Build on the functional lead model across SAFECOM, with the additional creation of Project Management and Governance functional lead positions.**

## 6. **EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

The current State Emergency Management Plan (SEMP) and its supporting documents is overly complex and layered.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **The SEMC focus on; drafting an updated SEMP, clarifying accountabilities of leadership, implementing systems for monitoring hazard plans, coordination cross sector planning and embedding the assurance framework against the intent of the Emergency Management Act 2004.**

It is evident there has been a lack of trust between the emergency services and with SAFECOM. Fire and Emergency Services also need to build the trust and confidence of Government. Improving trust has benefits for the workforce and volunteers, and is amplified through the stakeholder bodies which are the United Firefighters Union, the Country Fire Service Volunteer Association and the State Emergency Service Volunteer Association.

The findings and recommendations of this review builds on the government's current initiatives. It also builds on ministerial expectations and priorities. Thereby creating the foundations for the Commission's own priorities across four key areas;

**Prevention:** Using ICT in property fire safety systems and leveraging off recent innovative national research and technology to better identify bushfire and flood prone land risks.

**Planning:** Introducing the latest AVL technology, not only for safety but to support long term planning. Using location based incident records and response times to better plans for new stations.

**Response:** A continued focus on safety and welfare, creating a mentally healthy workplace for all staff and volunteers. Preparing for the next generation of volunteers across urban and regional South Australia. To create an adaptive and innovative CFS and SES for the future.

**Recovery:** Improved technology and trained volunteers will rapidly assess post-disaster damage, and initiate coordinated recovery efforts across community, business, infrastructure and the environment.

'Stronger Together', the recently released Disaster Resilience Strategy provides guidance on how these priorities will link across government, business, the not-for profit sector and the community.

The new Fire and Emergency Services Headquarters will provide the ideal hub to bring together all of the Fire and Emergency Services and, as a technology hub not only provide a state-of the art control centre but also the opportunity to entrench these strategic priorities in a coordinated manner.

This report does not recommend:

- Fire station closures or cuts to fire crews
- Staff cuts or restructure of emergency services, or
- The style of 'sector reform' the previous government attempted.

The intent of this paper is to provide a strategic analysis which has led to the six recommendations. The paper's intent is to also provide the authorising environment to drive improvement and therefore meet the government's expectations and ambitions, to allow;

1. Effective leadership through a unified emergency services executive team,
2. The Commission Board to administer a joined up approach across the emergency services.
3. Delivery of innovative projects through a program to reduce risks to community and to improve services to better support the health and welfare of all fire and emergency services personnel.
4. Delivery of the highest standards of service which will create a safer community.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. LEADERSHIP**

In order to understand the history of SAFECOM, an analysis of a wide range of reports and reviews since 2003 was undertaken. This analysis titled 'Summary of SAFECOM reviews since 2003' (Attachment 1) demonstrates SAFECOM and the Emergency Services have been unable to achieve the expectations of successive Governments.

Many reforms and improvements have been initiated within South Australia over the past 20 years however most have been within the siloed agencies. There is little evidence of a collaborative approach to reform and improved service delivery succeeding. This is evident from as far back as 1998 when the first significant failure occurred, the establishment of the Emergency Services Administrative Unit.

There are multiple reasons which can be attributed to this such as lack of clarity within the legislation, competition between agencies and stakeholder issues from industrial bodies.

Attempts to achieve higher levels of coordination by previous governments to centralise control through the establishment of a Commissioner function have been both unsuccessful and possibly unwarranted. The model of 'The Commission' as a governing body leading the emergency services can work. It needs to be made to work. The biggest failure of effective implementation of a coordinated model of governance strategy and policy to date is the lack of strong and effective leadership.

Attachment 1 details the history and important factors that have held back progressive change. It finds the principle reason for this lack of change is because previous leaders have not been able to and in some cases, not wanted to effectively implement the governance model as laid out in the *FES Act*.

It also demonstrates that during the drafting of the *FES Act* in 2004, an extensive consultative process was undertaken before enactment in 2005. What also became evident during the research was that the review processes that followed in 2008 and 2013 have recorded leadership has played a key role in not achieving the legislative intent.

The outcome of this is that despite the best of intent of government, the Emergency Services and the South Australian community are worse off due to a failure of leadership by the Chief Executives and the Chief Officers, the senior Public Sector Executives.

Examples are:

- Duplication across media and public warnings, five websites,
- Four sets of budget papers and the associated analysis scrutiny,
- Lack of a consolidated capital replacement and upgrade program based on overall risk,
- Complex layers of bureaucracy and governance resulting in multiple committees,
- Lack of a strategic ICT capability,
- Outdated staffing model of E-000 Call Receipt and Dispatch
- Poor stakeholder engagement across both paid and volunteer workforces,
- Inability to consult effectively on the *FES (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill*, drawn out through the adverse findings of the Select Committee report in April 2019,
- Poor access to consolidated data, and
- Ongoing unfunded budget pressures, which if allowed to continue will impact on service delivery.
- Ongoing duplication of response.

Embedding the intent of the legislation is challenging particularly when it is not understood from within the ranks of staff and volunteers. Ultimately, the *FES Act* and the administrative arrangements set expectations upon leadership. Disappointingly these expectations are not being met.

This is a key priority which needs to be addressed immediately and in-camera by the Chief Executive and Chief Officers.

All organisations are resistant to change unless they can see a derived benefit. The leadership challenge in this case is not about driving change. The challenge is doing properly what is already required.

Unfortunately, the previous resistance has been led from the Chief Officers. Since 2008, it has been recorded that the Chief Officers offered various reasons for not implementing the intent of the *FES Act* model citing reasons such as:

- Ambiguity between operational and non-operational matters.
- Chief Officers have perceived they were presented with a dilemma between their operational functions and their fiduciary duties as board members.
- A view that implementing the intent of the legislation would take a considerable period of time.
- Realigning staff from agencies to a more central location within SAFECOM would bring risks to operational performance (public safety).
- Questionable political support if concerns raised by volunteers and unions gain political momentum (EY Supplementary Report, October 2015).
- Questionable support of staff from operational agencies.
- Potential impact of budget savings issues on the outcome of the project.

In response to previous reviews Chief Officers have posed alternative options to the government's intent including removing the functions of SAFECOM altogether. Whilst this may be seen as populist within the ranks of Fire and Emergency Services personnel it has been observed that implementation of such a recommendation would be in the direct interest of the Chief Officers.

Public Sector employees are accountable for delivery. They are expected to deliver services within the legislative framework and in-line with the priorities of the elected government.

The Chief Executive SAFECOM and the Chief Officers are the contracted executives with the responsibility of leading the Emergency Services. The Chief Executive SAFECOM, as presiding officer of the SAFECOM Board bears the ultimate leadership accountability. The claims of supposed levels of ambiguity between the operational role of the Chief Officers and the functions of the Board are not warranted. The Chief Officers are accountable for making this work and not resisting or claiming to be confused as has been stated in the past.

The previous Government's attempts to remove such ambiguity through legislative change were halted in 2015. Regardless of those attempts the *FES Act* as legislated in 2005 is required to be implemented to the best possible intent to meet the needs of the South Australian community.

The senior executives need to make it work regardless of previous inaction. The senior executives need to be a unified front, accountable to each other and to the Minister. The establishment of a proposed Emergency Services Joint Executive Charter is a concept designed to hold everyone to account. A proposed charter would remove any claimed ambiguity in the legislation. It establishes the authority of Chief Executive SAFECOM to preside over the Commission. It could provide clarity of the Chief Officers' desire for operational autonomy. Most importantly it could draw the four most senior executives together to function as a unified team to lead the Commission and the four agencies.

This lack of effective leadership by former Chief Executives of SAFECOM and Chief Officers has led to a failure to implement the intended priorities of successive governments.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **The Chief Executive and Chief Officers need to drive collective leadership, be accountable through their executive contracts and through the development and implementation of an Emergency Services Joint Executive Charter which is agreed to and signed by the Chief Executive SAFECOM, each Chief Officer and the Minister for Emergency Services.**

## **2. GOVERNANCE**

The role and functions of the South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission (the Commission) are not well understood. It is a unique and sometimes confusing model. The Commission is also known by the corporate name SAFECOM. SAFECOM is in fact two different entities. Both entities are established under the *Fire and Emergency Services (FES) Act, 2005*. The roles of the two entities which share the common name of SAFECOM are very different.

**The First**, the Commission *also known as The Board* is the governing body, it is charged with the role of leading the Emergency Services.

**The Second**, the Commission staff, *also known as SAFECOM* is charged with supporting the Board and with providing coordinated functional support to the MFS, the CFS and the SES.

In simple terms there is the Commission (the Board) and there is also the Commission staff (SAFECOM). This differentiation has not been well articulated nor understood.

### **The Commission - the Board**

*The FES Act is "An Act to establish the South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission and to provide for the Commission's role in the governance, strategic and policy aspects of the emergency services sector; to provide for the continuation of a metropolitan fire and emergency service, a country fire and emergency service, and a state emergency service; to provide for the prevention, control and suppression of fires and for the handling of certain emergency situations; and for other purposes".*

The Commission is subject to the control and direction of the Minister. The extensive functions and powers of the Commission are exercised through a board (*FES Act, s.4, 4A& 7*) (Attachment 3). The Board as the governing entity is subject to the control of the portfolio Minister. It is charged with exercising a wide range of powers and functions. In some ways it acts as an agency Chief Executive, or in the role of what a Chief Executive would do if there were no Board.

### **The Commission staff – SAFECOM**

The second entity is SAFECOM, the public sector agency which is established under the Administrative Arrangements of the South Australian Government. Its objectives are described as; *'to create a safer community by providing a unified strategic direction to the emergency services sector for service delivery, governance and accountability. (Budget Paper 4 2018/2019)*. SAFECOM, as 'the Commission staff' is also referenced under s.17 of the *FES Act*.

The Government has made it clear it expects the Board to be a key linkage through which the three emergency services should operate together. As identified in finding (1), this has not always been easy as this unique model of governance has not been readily accepted by the fire and emergency services themselves. The unique model that has industrial representatives as well as the representation of the volunteer associations on its governing Board makes the Commission very different to a traditional public sector model. It is however what is expected within the legislation. It is up to all members of the Board, in particular the (ex-officio) senior public sector officials to meet this expectation.

In 2004, in anticipation of the new legislation, the interim SAFECOM Chief Executive recognised the unique model of governance and leadership over the Fire and Emergency Services would require some different thinking to traditional models. The interim Chief Executive commissioned the Locher review to provide advice. Locher made reference to the role and relationships between staff of the Commission and the functions of Chief Officers, which referenced the role of the board as the overarching authority through which governance is exercised. Governance is described as; the process by which organisations are directed, controlled and held to account.

The challenges posed for the Chief Officers as described in finding (1) above would be similar for the Commission staff. That is, the staff can only take the direction of their senior executives with the authority of the Board. In other words, every action a Commission staff member takes is authorised, or assumed to be capable of ratification by the board. The Board's decisions should stand.

Therefore the differentiation between the two roles needs to be understood within SAFECOM and the Fire and Emergency Service agencies. The operational expectations of the unique governance model and authorising environment were anticipated in 2004. It seems the model is still not well understood 15 years on. Locher emphasised all staff of the Commission, from the Chief Officers down would need to understand that their decisions could only be actioned with the authority of the Board of the Commission.

The Commission, through the Board, presided over by the Chief Executive SAFECOM needs to effectively exercise its governance function through direction and control, and to set standards of accountability across the Emergency Services. Clarifying and educating staff of the governance arrangements and the authority of the Board is a priority.

This need for clarity also sits amongst the Board members, which includes the Chief Officers who have sought advice as to how best implement their role. The confusion that repeats itself seems to factor around the ambiguity of what are sometimes seen as the 'statutory functions' of the Chief Officers, as in finding (1) (above) and the role they play on the Board.

Ultimately it is the Board which is the governing body. It needs to fully exercise its functions under sections 8 and 9 of the *FES Act*. In practical terms these functions are;

- Providing policy advice to Government on service delivery performance, risk management, compliance and assurance, areas for improvement, future investment options and,
- Effecting the intention of the *FES Act* and,
- Implementing the priorities of the elected Government of the day and,
- Executing these priorities and the administrative arrangements as laid out in the annual Budget Papers. Just as a Chief Executive of any South Australian Government agency is obligated to do under their employment contract.

The board also has the legislated function for setting fire service boundaries.

There are exceptions with which the board can deal with such as confidential staff matters, in-camera proceedings, budget-in-confidence and cabinet-in confidence items. These are matters that need to be managed by the senior public sector officials, through the Chief Executive SAFECOM.

In exercising these functions, Board minutes and outcomes should be transparent. A communique of monthly meetings should be circulated to all staff and volunteers for guidance and reference.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **Through the establishment of a Joint Executive Charter the Chief Executive and Chief Officers commit as a unified team when presenting at the SAFECOM Board. This will allow government priorities, improvements and changes to be implemented into operational policy.**



### 3. **FINANCIAL CONTROL**

#### **Metropolitan Fire Service Expenditure Inquiry**

Following the tabling of a report regarding the financial results for MFS for 2018/2019, the SAFECOM Board noted the intention of SAFECOM, working with the MFS and the Department of Treasury and Finance to undertake an expenditure inquiry. MFS also faces a number of other cost pressures around salary increases and future workers compensation payments.

The MFS plays a critical role in serving the Adelaide community across 21 stations as well as servicing 17 regional towns. In 2017/18 the MFS provided responses to 20,287 incidents. 1,054 of these responses were to structure fires and 615 to vehicle fires.

A summary of the response detail 2017/2018 is:


<b>Total Incidents responded</b>	<b>20,287</b>
Structure fires	1054
Vehicle fires	615
Other* fires	2,076
Dangerous substances	506
Rescues	5,206
Fire Alarms	6,417
Other* responses	4,114

*NB\* descriptions of 'other' are yet to be sourced.*

The annual report for 2018/2019 has yet to be finalised however it is anticipated that the incident response results will be similar to the previous year. Longer term trends over the past 10 years show an ongoing gradual decline in responses to structural fires and increases in responses to rescues and other incidents. As presented below there has not been any significant variance in total responses over the past decade.

MFS annual expenditure has grown from \$99.6m in 2008-09 to \$159m in 2018-19, after excluding the impact of significant revaluations of the workers compensation provision in recent years as a result of presumptive cancer workers' compensation coverage.

Over this same time period MFS staff (FTEs) have increased from 918 to 1,042. While incidents attended by MFS have remained largely static with 23,706 in 2008-09 and 20,287 in 2017-18, as presented in the following chart.




MFS actual expenses, excluding the impact of workers compensation, have exceeded budgeted expenses every year for the last five years.

Expenses (excl Workers' Compensation)	2014-15 \$m	2015-16 \$m	2016-17 \$m	2017-18 \$m	2018-19 \$m
Budget	127.9	133.8	137.4	141.9	151.1
Actual	130.4	136.2	143.0	152.6	159.0
<b>Amount over Budget</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>10.7</b>	<b>7.9</b>

Payments to the MFS represent just under half of the amount collected by the Emergency Services Levy and paid from the Community Emergency Services Fund.

MFS expenditure also represents approximately 55% of the total expenses of the Emergency Services.

Presumptive cancer workers' compensation coverage has increased expenses for MFS as the provision has been revalued which has been excluded from the above analysis. The overspend in the MFS budget combined with the higher level of workers' compensation claims payments presents a looming issue for cash requirements from the Emergency Services Levy. The following chart is from the workers' compensation actuary, forecasting sustained growth in claims.



The actual number of FTEs has increased by over 100 in the last five years and has exceeded the budgeted FTE number. This includes 50 additional FTEs included as part of the last enterprise agreement intended to reduce overtime costs.

Personnel (Full Time Equivalent)	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19
Budget FTEs	939	943	943	945	1,000
Actual FTEs	920	949	965	995	1,042
<b>FTEs over Budget</b>	<b>-19</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>42</b>

The number of employees receiving remuneration above the public sector executive base level remuneration rate has increased significantly in recent years, increasing from 51 (6% of the workforce) in 2014-15 to 155 in 2018-19 (15% of the workforce). The executive base level remuneration rate in 2018-19 was \$151,000.

The MFS Enterprise Agreement 2017 came into effect on 21 December 2017 and expires on 1 January 2020. The agreement has provided wage adjustments of:

- 1.6% on 1 January 2018
- 1.6% on 1 January 2019
- 1.6% on 1 January 2020

With further increases as a result of proposed productivity and efficiency reviews of:

- 2% on 1 July 2018
- 2% on 1 July 2019

Providing a 3.6% increase, compared to the 2.4% increase for the general public sector, this represents a total cost impact of \$2.6 million.

MFS has reported regular overspend against budget over many years, it had been anticipated that the 50 additional staff would offset the overtime costs in 2018/2019 however this did not eventuate. The outcomes of the recent additional \$2.6 million pay rise granted without any offsets in productivity or

efficiencies, as well the projected increase in workers compensation costs over the next five years places additional future pressures on the MFS budget.

The results of the expenditure inquiry into the MFS will provide outcomes which can then be used to initiate broader review and options for improvements across MFS.

**RECOMMENDATION**

- **Outcomes from the recently announced MFS expenditure inquiry to initiate a broader review of service delivery models and capital programs that better balance and align risk to service delivery outcomes and investment decisions.**

**4. INNOVATION AND DELIVERY**

Innovation and delivery in this context refers to the investment and governance of capital works upgrades to;

- Information communications technology
- Fleet
- Buildings and facilities

Delivery of successful project management outcomes can also realise greater benefits for organisations by bringing forward successful business improvement.

**Information and Communications Technology (ICT)**

A key factor in the success of emergency operations is the timely and efficient use of information and in an era of big data, emergency services are expected to be able access a full range of information sources. High quality information allows incident managers and the operational teams to function effectively. The importance of this effectiveness also includes the issuing of timely and appropriate warnings to the community.

To achieve effective high-quality operational information management and intelligence requires more than just the communications systems such as radio and telephones. It requires comprehensive, well-constructed facilities with built in redundancy and backup systems. It also requires secure, high quality information management systems such as powerful databases and access to high speed connectivity and secure systems for data storage. To effectively support incident management, these systems need have robust dissemination mechanisms for this data, generally in a spatial format, such as mapping and tracking systems.

South Australia has fallen behind in the provision of updated incident management and coordination facilities. Its information communication systems are also falling behind other states and territories (Attachment 1). A series of operational reviews in recent years has also highlighted the lack of Information management and support systems to support operational coordination, and the required flow-on systems to support the projection of public information and warnings.

When operating effectively, this information technology does more than support incidents and operations. The capability that supports these operational systems can also provide critical, reliable and comprehensive information which can be used to better understand risks based on the response data. This allows for more informed decision-making upon which to set future investment priorities.

Whilst there is a lack of ICT capability compared to other states. The Government has invested significant funding in ICT programs (Attachment 4). The implementation of major ICT projects such as Alert SA Phase 1, the Emerald database and Alert SA Phase 2 has been poor. They have suffered from poor governance, project planning, documentation, contract management, and monitoring. This has led to poor outcomes such as cost over runs and delays to implementation.

### **Fleet**

The fire and emergency services maintain a high quality fleet to support staff and volunteers. Funding is provided for the progressive replacement of tankers and appliances as well as funding to retrofit safety systems. These programs are managed separately within each of the agencies. The current challenge as described in SAFECOM'S submission to the economic and finance Committee hearing in May 2019 emphasised a cost pressure of maintaining the fleet to the current standard. The concern is the average age of the heavy vehicle fleet within the fire services continues to grow.

### **Buildings and facilities**

There is also a major capital works program to update stations and facilities. Again this is currently managed within each of the agencies. The current Government has also provided additional funding under Project Renew (Attachment 4). In recent years there has been poor coordination of major capital projects, examples include Mount Barker and Angle Park. These are examples of opportunities lost. They demonstrate the need for better coordination which could lead to improved outcomes at less cost.

The development of ongoing capital works by agencies alone may not create direct risks. It is an example of the opportunities lost towards improving connection between the emergency services as described in the conclusion of this paper. Major capital programs for stations and facilities also need to align to meet future risk. Due to the long lead times in terms of planning and development such as growth of the greater Adelaide region there is time to plan to meet the collective needs of all agencies if they work together under the one-governance model.

The establishment of a capital works framework, governed by the Board which identifies and supports collective priorities needs to be expedited. Such a policy framework would then establish better articulation of service delivery outcomes, better explain community benefit as well as potentially demonstrating benefits back to operational staff and volunteers.

The Government has already funded a range of capital works and improvements, it is imperative these projects are delivered within the scope of their investment. The most significant of these is the SAFECOM (ESS) headquarters facility. Over the coming months work will commence on finalising the internal design of the new headquarters. This presents a significant opportunity to commence not only effective project management and governance overseen by the Board but also an opportunity to create a dialogue with all staff. Improved technologies will establish a highly functioning Sate Control Centre and an opportunity to design the HQ based on functional responsibilities rather than the traditional emergency service silos. This will allow the staff of SAFECOM, the SES headquarters, the CFS headquarters, as well as the senior executives and their support functions from MFS to work in a much more collective and collaborative environment.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **Develop a 10 year capital works program that identifies priorities to enhance operational performance and meet future risks. Delivery of funded projects to be closely monitored by the SAFECOM Board as the sponsoring authority.**

## 5. **POLICY ADVICE AND SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT**

Public sector agencies have two fundamental roles:

- Delivering services to their communities on behalf of their government and;
- Supporting their government to meet the needs of their communities.

The links between community and government and public sector agencies are inseparable and service to both are critically important. Chief Executives cannot do one well and ignore the other.

Fire and Emergency Services are community focused, the priority is on service delivery which is saving lives. Fire and Emergency Services can only remain effective by having the support of their governments to drive incremental and progressive change.

The early observations of the new Chief Executive were that there was a lack of confidence by Government in advice it was receiving from Emergency Services in South Australia. Examples of inadequate development of policy and poor collaboration with other departments, has led to this lack of confidence by government in SAFECOM and the Fire and Emergency Services.

Communities expect integrity in their governments and this can only be achieved if public sector agencies are providing the highest levels of support, which includes frank advice. Where confidence in officials is gained the advice they provide is heeded. Likewise officials need to understand and deliver on government's key priorities and objectives.

Achievement of government priorities such as the delivery of large capital works or change initiatives can only occur if they are project managed effectively. As observed in finding four, this has not always been the case in SAFECOM. Despite best efforts the links between governance and effective project management have not been connected. When overlaid with different and sometimes competing priorities of the emergency services, this has increased the chance of failure. The establishment of Functional Lead roles across support areas such as HR and Finance has been successful. A project functional lead across all projects is required to effectively minimise this risk.

SAFECOM and the emergency services have not been able to achieve some of the basic expectations of the Government. Examples include timeliness and responsiveness to ministerial correspondence, the provision of updates on how key projects are tracking and when they are delivered, opportunities to engage with key staff and volunteers has been challenging and business cases have not provided savings offsets.

One of the challenges over successive years has been the fragmented approach taken to the receipt of policy advice as it comes from four separate agencies, none of which are of any significant size compared to other portfolio areas such as policing, transport, education or health.

The establishment of a functional lead for this policy support has already commenced by changing processes to bring all ministerial briefings through the Chief Executive SAFECOM's office however further work needs to be done to strengthen ministerial advice and support.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

- **Build on the functional lead model across SAFECOM, with the additional creation of a governance and project management functional lead positions.**

## 6. **EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

The preamble of the *Emergency Management Act 2004* describes its functions as; '*to establish strategies and systems for the management of emergencies in the State: and for other purposes*'.

This provides focus and guidance for what is expected of those responsible for emergency management, or to consider this from another angle: *Does the State have appropriate strategies and systems in place for the management of emergencies?*

This question and a number of consequent questions as described at the end of this chapter should frame the establishment of an assurance system so that the first principle of government, protection and safety of its citizens is actioned effectively. In addition, the question should be framed through understanding the consequences of such events and what is the likelihood of them occurring; that is: understanding risk.

History provides an important indicator that the likelihood of emergencies occurring into the future and the impact (consequences) of them. In South Australia clearly and by far and above other events demonstrates the extreme risk of natural hazards, particularly bush fire (Attachment 5). More than 40 people have died in South Australia from bushfires since Ash Wednesday in 1983. The impact from other emergencies is significant but nothing else comes close to this confronting statistic (Attachment 5).

A focus on new and emerging risks is also required. Security and threats to human health such as from pandemic and extreme heat are examples. The salient point is to learn the lessons of the past and don't make the same mistakes again which is why understanding and learning from these historic events should remain a priority.

The most recent activation of South Australia's emergency management arrangements was the 2016 system black event. Following the emergency, Gary Burns APM was engaged to review the operations. He found that appropriate preparations, warnings and response personnel were activated in advance and during the event and noted emergency and government personnel worked effectively through the challenging conditions.

The Australian Energy Market Commission has also recently delivered its report and announced its intention to hold to account Wind Farm operators so as to prevent a reoccurrence of the poor notifications to the market operator for 'feathering' of turbines. This along with ongoing investment in regional asset upgrades and improved interconnectors reduce the risk of another black system event.

Burns also provided comment on governance. Focussing on the emergency management framework as laid out through the *Emergency Management Act, 2004* and the State Emergency Management Plan. He commented that the *Emergency Management Act* was not meeting its objectives (2017: xiii). Burns proposed a new structural framework and an assurance model to provide a point of focus for emergency management.

Burns also suggested this could be addressed by consolidating core components into SAFECOM and placing all components of emergency management under one responsible Minister, the Minister for Emergency Services. He made a series of comments around gaps in the current committee structure created to meet the intent of the *Emergency Management Act 2004*. Comment was also made on gaps in operationalising agencies when events start to scale up and briefings need to be shared across agencies, NGOs and functional areas (2017:80).

Burns commented that the role and function of the Emergency Management Council should be clarified under the SEMP so that Ministers and other persons undertaking leadership roles is clear (2017:87). The review provided a catalyst for a range of changes that has strengthened emergency management arrangements in South Australia. There is a high level of awareness and engagement across all public sector agencies and good collaboration with local government and the not-for-profit sector.

Lessons learned, not only from the system black event but from emergencies nationally and internationally over the past two decades point to the priorities of alerting, warning and updating the community which are equally as important as the response and coordination efforts themselves.

Burns' comments about clarifying the role of EMC are poignant, particularly when it comes to community messaging. In times of crisis communities look to their leaders. The community expects senior politicians to be standing alongside their senior uniformed officials. Ministers (within their functional remit) and Premiers should utilise their influence and authority to support senior officials and the community with a focus on managing the consequences of a crisis.

Senior officials with the technical expertise and situational awareness allows them to lead the response to the crisis. They are expected to exercise their authority under their appointed mandate to make operational decisions and communicate them with effect.

The benefits of the partnership between political leaders and senior officials is then best and most simply messaged through the *Guillani approach* first observed during the September 11 event of 2001 of messaging during emergencies as:

- What we know
- What we don't know
- What we are doing about it and
- What we want you to do;

This approach resonates as a central premise to messaging as much today as it did 18 years ago.

The structures set down within government need to be able to be extended into emergency management. Not within the confines of response and coordination for which senior officials are tasked and empowered, but through consequence and community impact. All Ministers and senior officials need to be working within their portfolio area and coming together as the scale and consequences of emergencies increase. In this context Burns' commentary was about clarifying the role of EMC. Consideration should be given to recognising the role of EMC within the *Emergency Management Act 2004*, recognising Cabinet as an asset in providing options and advice to the Premier in times of crisis.

There has been considerable willingness and effort by various agencies to take the lessons learned from the Burns review and implement a range of governance improvements. State Emergency Management Council (SEMC) has led the development of a better framework to understand the levels of strategic risks faced across government.

The development of a new advisory group structure, the establishment of an assurance group with an independent chair and the clarification and prioritisation of strategic risk have all been recent positive outcomes. As a result of the Burns Review, SEMC authorised an extensive, though somewhat complex strategic plan. This plan has provided some foundation for setting some key priorities for SEMC however with 35 strategic tasks and 83 success measures, it is quite cumbersome. Work is currently underway to reduce some of this complexity and the establishment of the new advisory groups provides the opportunity to refocus priorities based on risk to meet the expectations of government.



Ultimately the government needs assurance that its agencies are as a collective, meeting the expectations of the emergency management legislation. The assurance process needs to consider these expectations and build a framework around four fundamental questions in the context of the preamble and the intent of the *Emergency Management Act 2004*;

- Are systems and strategies in place for management of emergencies?
- Are the functions of SEMC being carried out effectively?
- Are Agencies who are accountable for hazards (bush fire, earthquake, terrorism etc.) meeting expectations and is the capacity to meet these hazards being monitored?
- Are strategic risks (cross agency) risks being addressed?

**RECOMMENDATION**

- **The SEMC focus on; drafting an updated SEMP, clarifying accountabilities of leadership, implementing systems for monitoring hazard plans, coordination cross sector planning and embedding the assurance framework against the intent of the Emergency Management Act 2004.**

## **CONCLUSION**

Lack of trust across the Emergency Services, has led to ongoing duplication and inefficiencies. Agencies remain siloed preventing the benefits of collective effort from being realised.

It is a disappointment to review and analyse that the South Australian Parliament's intent back in 2005 has not been realised. This intent of having Fire and Emergency services managed through a collective model of a Commission with an appointed Board of which each emergency service is a part, has not yet reached its potential.

There is a long history of resistance to the intent of the *FES Act*. The intent is stated clearly in the preamble 'to provide for Commission's role in the governance, strategic and policy aspects of the emergency services sector', that is; a governing entity established to lead the policy and administration aspects of the emergency services. In spite of the extensive consultation that was undertaken through the development of the legislation before it went to Parliament in 2005 and the diligent efforts to establish the Commission, resistance was recorded from as early as 2008 through the Murray review. Murray observed the expectations towards consolidation of corporate functions had not occurred. Further reaction to consolidation was clear from the Chief Officers when they opposed the recommendations of the Holloway Review in 2013. Their proposal was for a 'Lead agency model for the governance of the South Australian Emergency Services Sector' demonstrates the strength of this resistance from the agency leaders.

It is little wonder there was strong resistance from within Fire and Emergency Services to the reforms as proposed by Minister Piccolo in 2014.

Fortunately some work has progressed under the 'Functional Support model'. Through this model SAFECOM is moving towards creating alignment as recommended under the EY review of 2015, however progress has been slow particularly from when it commenced. Once again Chief Officers raised concerns of this coordination effort citing safety concerns, claims of a lack of political support, and resistance from within their own staff.

The previous Government's reform program failed as it did not understand the deeply held cultures within the three emergency services. It also underestimated the role and influence the senior public officials, the Chief Officers could play, whether by intent or by silence. The plan by Minister Piccolo to place a Commissioner over the top and implement structural reform was rejected from within. The lack of executive support did not assist the government's intentions.

Middle management within each of the fire and emergency services also have a role to play. They also have a range of significant challenges. They are required to lead and provide services to their key operational people who demand high standards from their leaders. The vast majority of middle management in both the paid and volunteer services come from the operational ranks themselves.

Operational firefighters and volunteers join their services because of their strong interest in serving their communities. They are motivated by working in a challenging environment where decisions have to be made in split seconds. There is little interest in detailed long-term planning and the governance of government. Operational personnel generally do not work across and with other emergency services except at actual incidents. It is not their fault that they do not see value in joining up on areas such as consolidated budgets, training systems, collective procurement and joint information and warning protocols.

Engagement between uniformed services at the operational level does not happen without significant effort. It is up to the leadership to make this happen. When engagement across agencies is done well it brings out the very best of outcomes. Volunteers and staff of each service get to know more about their roles and capabilities, they become familiar with each other's responsibilities, they share their lived experiences and they get to value and appreciate the role they each play in serving their communities.

At present in South Australia the opportunities for these shared experiences seem limited, even though the value of working together has been long-recognised. In 2003 Dawkins commented on the high value of breaking down this mistrust which was achieved when volunteers and staff worked together on operations and deployments.

The legislation is quite clear, through the role and the functions of the Commission as established, an opportunity was created in 2005 to bring fire and emergency services personnel at all levels closer together. It is unfortunate that this opportunity has not been realised. A failure of senior public sector staff to efficiently lead and implement the intent of the legislation has held back the development of a truly joined up and effective emergency services capability in South Australia.

The Marshall Government has ensured the mistakes of the previous government will not be repeated. It has placed new executives into three of the four key roles. It has set an expectation demanding strong leadership. It expects this leadership to deliver on the government's priorities and to act in the interests of supporting emergency service staff and volunteers through a range of programs. It has made it clear it expects the Board to be the key linkage point that brings the fire and emergency services together. It also expects the Board to provide collective advice on challenges, risks and opportunities for improvement.

The government is also acutely aware of how the world is rapidly changing. People still want to help each other in times of crisis. It may be time to question whether the traditional models and structures of our uniformed volunteers with ranks and chains of command really suit a modern world where big data, multiple channels of messaging and instant information processing mean the current CFS and SES systems and structures seems like something from the past. There is a need to reimagine what we want our volunteer services to look like to not only meet community need but to also fit contemporary community values.

The government's mandate is to work closely with the representative bodies of the fire and emergency services, referencing the need to work collectively to make the best possible decisions for the South Australian community.

By setting expectations of the executive leadership to work as a team, to innovate and deliver to meet community expectations. By working closely with the representative bodies and engaging with staff and volunteers and by accepting the Commission's need to function as it was originally intended success will come. The right leadership environment will bring forward a united Board which can then authorise collective decision making. With its broad membership of emergency management professionals, stakeholder bodies and independent directors, the Board has the skills base to make the best decisions in the interests of community safety. It has not previously been able to fully exercise its functions as intended and in some cases it has even been prohibited from doing so.

For the Board to fully exercise its powers it needs to operate within a strong governance framework, it needs to be able to exercise financial control, particularly when expenditure is in excess of budget, it needs to have oversight of capital works and ICT projects, it needs to be able to make decisions that better support a unified approach to the work place welfare, health and safety of all emergency services personnel. It needs to have assurance mechanisms in place to provide for ongoing improved operational information management systems to allow effective incident management, public information and warnings, to have access to reliable data upon which to make sound funding decisions, it needs to be supported by strong executive support and have access to high-standard reports on activities and accounts. The Board has functional responsibilities to influence long-term strategic planning and investment by determining fire service boundaries. It is required to oversight workforce management levels, and is accountable for the efficient and equitable allocation of resources.

For the Board to be successful it will need to be more transparent. It will need to build its confidence to direct, control and hold to account the emergency services for the purposes of coordination. It also needs to be able to successfully implement the priorities of government as well as delivering against its own

objectives and priorities. It needs to be able to communicate a united front to the workforce and promote the work of the emergency services and their value proactively to the taxpayers of South Australia.

The staff of SAFECOM play a critical role in supporting the Board in achieving its functions and responsibilities. SAFECOM staff serve with the authority of the board through the Chief Executive and there is a growing trust and confidence in their capabilities. The positive steps to greater alignment since 2015 under the Functional Support Model, has also permitted SAFECOM staff to develop greater capacity and trust with their emergency services colleagues. The joint work they have undertaken and the standards that are achieved to support staff and volunteers on WHS, financial support programs, and the Emerald data base project are positive examples.

Through recent personnel changes within SAFECOM there are positive signs that even greater levels of collective effort will continue to come to fruition.

The construction of the new Fire and Emergency Services Headquarters presents the greatest catalyst yet to building on this work. It is the biggest opportunity to create a unified approach to delivering fire and emergency services in South Australia.

In the words of the Hon. John Dawkins AO in 2003, it is not optional for Fire and Emergency Services to join up, it is expected. Governments and communities expect it and if it does not occur there will be no confidence in the Commission and the emergency services. SAFECOM and the three emergency services have suffered through a lack of trust amongst themselves and with successive governments through a failure to achieve what is expected.

Poor support and advice to government has limited emergency service capability. Even though investment has increased and the efforts of staff and volunteers continue to deliver high-standard operational services. The lack of leadership has meant South Australia has fallen behind most other States and Territories in its policy, capability and supporting mechanisms. Government stands ready to support, but it expects joined up and coordinated agencies so that efficient and effective fire and emergency services can be delivered.

**SUMMARY OF REVIEWS SINCE 2003, RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN  
FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES COMMISSION UNDER THE  
FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES ACT 2005, AS AMENDED**

**Report of the Task Force - Hon John Dawkins AO, Hon Stephen Baker, Mr Richard McKay**

**– May 2003**

**Emergency Services Review**

**Key recommendations summary**

- Bring forward new legislation to create a South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission.
- All strategic and organisational responsibilities of the Fire and Emergency Services to be transferred to the Commission.
- The Commission to be responsible for developing equitable and risk-based processes for resolving and reviewing boundary issues.
- Fire and Emergency Services to have their own operational capabilities however to be responsible to the Commission.
- The Commission to have the Chief Officers as voting members, with Chair of the Commission to have the casting vote and non-voting members also sit on the Commission.

**Observations of the review**

The review noted deficiencies still remained as to a lack of cooperation even though there had been a range of reviews since the Ash Wednesday bush fires of 1983 (2003:13). The review was established not long after the Tulka fire near Port Lincoln. A review of the Tulka operation found that concerns were raised around cooperation and the report provided recommendations that mutual aid between fire services should not be optional. (2003:14).

Dawkins noted there had been few changes in the South Australian Fire and Emergency Services. One comment which stands out *“the sector has been much reviewed and little reformed”*. (2003:15)

He also noted the failures of the formation of the Emergency Services Administrative Unit (ESAU). These failures related to; the secrecy under which it was formed, the shared services funding arrangements, the lack of a clear explanation for its purpose and the reluctance of the ESO's to accept the new arrangements. He noted the different service cultures prevented the formation of productive working relationships. (2003:27)

The review noted animosity between volunteers and career staff but also observed relationships improved where volunteers and staff worked together on deployments and operations. It also noted an ageing and diminishing volunteer workforce. (2003:19)

The review emphasised the importance of integrating good governance within and across the Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs) rather than having each organisation operating under separate and different governance. Dawkins also noted challenges of the arrangements at that time made it difficult for the Minister of the day to exercise control. (2003:12)

## **The Hon Patrick Conlon MP, Minister for Emergency Services - August 2003**

### **Minute to staff and volunteers regarding Government's expectations of Emergency Services**

#### **Summary**

The minute outlined the Government's response to the Dawkins Review and confirmed the Government's commitment to the establishment of a Fire and Emergency Services Commission. He outlined the proposed reform of emergency services was to enhance community safety and to set expectations of working within a framework of Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery.

It also emphasised the alignment between the Commission and the soon-to-be enacted *Emergencies Act, 2004*.

## **Locher Human Resources – November 2004**

### **The SAFECOM Office**

#### **Key points of the review**

- The SAFECOM Board, and by association the SAFECOM office would have a responsibility under the new legislation to ensure community safety.
- Every action a Commission staff member takes is authorised, or assumed to be capable of ratification by the Board. The Board's decisions should stand.
- Chief Officers have considerable responsibilities for the day to day activities of their organisation, however along with the other board members, Chief Officers would have a number of responsibilities which extend beyond their individual responsibilities. (2004:8)
- The SAFECOM office structure would need to be able to fulfil specialist advice and an efficiency of operation by being able to consolidate like activities (2004:10). That is, lead within specialist fields of capability such as industrial relation, human resources, finance management and the like.
- SAFECOM office out-posted staff could find themselves in a position where their advice may be not be taken by Chief Officers. In such circumstances Chief Officers should advise the SAFECOM Chief Executive of such decisions.
- Locher emphasised regardless of the previous dot point, Chief Officers have a direct responsibility for the efficient use of resources across the sector. (2004:16)

#### **Observations of the Review**

This review was commissioned by the interim Chief Executive of the (proposed) Commission in anticipation of the yet-to-be enacted *Fire and Emergency Services Act*. It recognised the previous failures of ESAU. It was deemed a failure due to the lack of consultation of its creation, no legislative mandate, its shared services funding model which transferred funding from the Emergency Services to ESAU and the expectations created that ESAU would create savings and efficiencies that could be returned to Government.

The Interim Chief Executive correctly anticipated the new legislation, and its expectations of the effective coordination of fire and emergency services. As part of preparing for the enactment of the new Act, Locher provided advice on the significance of recognising the unique challenges the staff of the new Commission would face.

Locher emphasised challenges, posed by the creation of the Commission. The legislation would establish a unique model of governance within the Emergency Services context. This model of wide-ranging responsibilities assigned to a board as the governing body of the Commission. This is unique, not only within emergency services but also within the public sector.

In order to address the challenges of this governance model Locher anticipated the different reporting arrangements the staff of the Commission would need to have, with the Board and with the Chief Officers of the ESOs. This was emphasised as a very important differentiation, as staff of the Commission who were transferring from the soon-to-be disbanded ESAU would need to recognise their role as being accountable to the Commission.

Locher also analysed the role of the Chief Officers of the Emergency Services. Noting as members of the Commission they were to be actively engaged in the governing of the Commission as members of the board. They would be expected to lead and deliver their operational services and at the same time, be accountable, through the governance arrangements of the Commission to act within the authority of the Board, or make decisions assumed as capable of ratification by the board.

### **Second Reading Speeches, Legislative Council (LC) and Lower House (LH) - 2005**

#### **Fire and Emergency Services Bill**

The speeches defined the background and processes which led to the introduction of the proposed legislation.

- The establishment of the proposed Commission was communicated through a twelve month extensive consultative process across the state.
- Both volunteers and career staff were represented on the working party responsible for drafting the Bill.
- An implementation taskforce was established, this was supported by a number of volunteer and industrial committees which were also established to implement the reform recommendations of the Dawkins review.
- The Commission and the appointed Board would have strong governance powers over the MFS, CFS and SES.
- The Legislative Council speech emphasised governance is the process by which organisations are directed, controlled and held to account. (LC, 2005:6)

The Bill was passed following a range of amendments, principally around the construct and membership of the board. When first enacted the *FES Act* prescribed the membership and construct of the board under a complex arrangement of voting and non-voting members. This was later reviewed and amended to the current board structure some years later.

The *Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005* was proclaimed on 1 October 2005 as “An Act to establish the South Australian and Emergency Services Commission and to provide for the Commission’s role in the governance, strategic and policy aspects of the emergency services sector...”

### **John Murray APM – March 2008**

#### **The Review of the Fire and Emergency Services Act (FES) 2005**

In line with the commencement of new legislation, the *FES Act* was subject to formal review within three years of enactment. Mr John Murray was tasked with providing an analysis and evaluation of the *FES Act* to evaluate the extent as to whether there been improvements in the management of the emergency service organisations and the provision of service to the community.

#### **Observations of the Review**

The review acknowledged the changes brought about by the new *FES Act* had introduced significant challenges to existing office holders since its provisions called for organisational changes and a major cultural shift.

The early work of the Interim Board was commended however it was agreed that in an environment which appeared resistant to change, progress was slow and incremental since the new board was formalised in

legislation (2005:23). Essentially the observations of Murray were that the ESO's remained in organisational silos.

He found the expectations towards a consolidated approach to budgeting had not occurred, with the Department of Finance and Treasury advising something was inhibiting SAFECOM's ability to provide advice that truly reflects an across-the-sector allocation of resources (2005:33). The same was said of the annual reporting process noting the three ESO reports were essentially territorial with little emphasis on their links to the Commission and the broader sector. (2005:34)

The intention of the FES Act was to bring together through the new governance model, far greater alignment and coordination. Murray observed the most pertinent change of this was the impact on the Chief Officers by moving from their previous relative autonomy to one which demands shared responsibility in sector-wide governance for non-operational matters (2005:1).

Murray emphasised a coordinated model of governance and practice had not been embedded into the management of SAFECOM and the Emergency Services.

He proffered his opinion that reasons for this delay was across three areas;

- Ambiguity between operational and non-operational matters which allowed Chief Officers to interpret many matters as purely operational and as a consequence allowed them to retain status quo.
- Chief Officers perceived they were presented with a dilemma between their operational functions and their fiduciary duties as board members.
- A view that implementing the intent of the legislation would take a considerable period of time.

The core of Murray's observations were that the best way to implement the legislative intent of the *FES Act* would be to strengthen the current legislation to empower the Commission with greater authority to direct. Whilst there were subsequent amendments, to the *FES Act*, these amendments did not take into account Murray's central premise of the shortcomings as he observed which needed to be addressed in order to strengthen and achieve a sector-wide model of governance. (2005:2).

Murray also noted that the Minister of the day appointed by administrative arrangement a 'Commissioner of Fire and Emergencies', however this arrangement seemed to be short-lived and reverted to the function of Chief Executive of SAFECOM.

### **Recommendations of the Review**

Murray's reflections of the Dawkins review and the subsequent proclamation of the FES Act in 2005 emphasised that the reforms had been designed to improve the pervading silo mentality of the emergency services, the underlying tensions between paid staff and volunteers and the consequent resistance to change. He argued stronger intervention was required (2005:98).

He viewed one of the reasons for the delay in bringing forward a coordinated governance model as originally anticipated in the second reading speeches was due to *apparent* confusion and lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities which was of significant concern. So much so that his first recommendation to review was:

*'The preamble of the FES ACT be amended to include a stronger emphasis on the strategic and policy purposes of the Commission, highlighting its key role in the governance of the emergency services sector (2008:4).'*



The review also made a series of broad-ranging recommendations to refine accountabilities, improve representation in decision making, recognise the importance of titles and the need to clarify between operational and non-operational as well as a range of recommendations to improve overall coordination of the emergency services sector.

### **The Hon Paul Holloway - August 2013**

#### **Review of the *Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005***

Section 149 of the *FES Act* required a further review of the operation of the *FES Act* to take place between 2009 and 2013.

#### **Observations of the Review**

The review made a range of observations, which centred on an even stronger argument of the need for overall reform than Murray posited. Holloway noted the original case for change had not been effected under the Commission governance model. Holloway also observed the Board model of leadership and governance was out of favour amongst fire and emergency services nationally (2013:17).

Holloway noted Murray's concerns and commented that the Murray Review recommendations around strengthening and clarifying the role of the Commission were not translated into legislation. He observed little ongoing change towards coordination had come into effect.

A range of other observations were made by Holloway who proposed other amendments such as enacting consultation provisions with the volunteer associations, review of boundaries, a range of recommendations posed as an outcome of the Wangary bushfire Coroners recommendations and other technical improvements.

The implementation of bringing a Bill forward to enact these recommendations has been delayed for many years due primarily to the non-enactment of recommendation 1.

#### **Recommendations of the Review**

The recommendations centred on Holloway's views under recommendation 1;

*'That the MFS, CFS and SES be incorporated into a departmental structure under the direction of a Chief Executive.....'*

An extensive communications and consultative program was conducted throughout 2014, based on the proposal to implement recommendation 1 of the review. However the proposal was abandoned. Again this was due to lack of support within the ESOs.

Due to the delays posed by opposition and eventual abandonment of recommendation 1, the remainder of the amendments have been delayed for years. The amendment to recognise the volunteer charters in legislation was passed in July 2019. Other proposed amendments which emanate from the Holloway review are expected to be debated and passed in the spring session of parliament in 2019.

#### **Contrary report submitted by Chief Officers of the Emergency Services**

Further to the resistance the government faced towards proposed reform in 2014/15. As part of the Holloway review the Chief Officers of the three ESOs submitted a paper titled 'Lead Agency Model for the governance of the South Australian Emergency Services Sector'.

The paper proposed a return to the previous model before the implementation of the *FES ACT* and the establishment of the Commission. As Holloway was proposing a model that was completely opposite to the Chief Officers, their views were not agreed.

## **Design of an integrated services model for the fire and emergency services sector, Ernst and Young (EY) 2013 to 2015**

EY was commissioned by AGD and SAFECOM to undertake a range of reviews. This process derived from intentions of sector reforms and to realign functions due to significant cuts to the SAFECOM budget by the Government in 2012. The review focussed on the functional support services SAFECOM provides to the Emergency Services and developed proposals to better align the support services provided. The review noted that as SAFECOM had been subjected to a range of significant budget cuts, this limited SAFECOM's ability to provide the ongoing services it had been providing and for what it had been previously funded to do, for most of the previous decade. The review also observed that a significant number of support positions (HR, IT, Corporate Communications, Emergency Management, and Executive Support) were based in the ESOs and that through functional realignment and a proposed restructure of this support, then greater efficiencies and better services support to the ESO could be enabled.

The recommendations of the review were not acted upon, instead a 'Functional Support model' was proposed, of which a range of elements were actioned to bring about better alignment.

These five functions are described as:

- Finance;
- People;
- Capability Acquisition Sustainment and Availability;
- ICT;
- Public Information Community Engagement and Media.

A range of these changes have been implemented. A project titled 'Darwin' was established under the premise of an approach to evolutionary change. However it has been reported progress was stalled through poor implementation of Project Darwin. The principles of a 'Functional Lead' model still stand within the SAFECOM governance model, however its application has not been progressed as far as it was originally intended. Therefore the efficiencies EY originally identified to deliver support functions has not been as effective as originally presented.

## **Contrary feedback to the EY review submitted by Chief Officers of the Emergency Services**

The Chief Officers once again provided additional feedback to the EY Review, this feedback included;

- Risks to operational performance (public safety) from potentially realigning staff from agencies to a more central location within SAFECOM.
- Questionable political support if concerns raised by volunteers and unions gain political momentum.
- Questionable support of staff from operational agencies
- Potential impact of budget savings issues on the outcome of the project.

It is not clear why the Chief Officers formed this view as functional alignment goes to the heart of the original intent as described by Dawkins which led to the proclamation of the *FES Act* in 2005. Public Safety is often proclaimed as a reason to not initiate change within emergency services, when in fact public safety should be advocated as the reason to deliver change in a changing environment.

## **Noetic Solutions – 2016**

### **Project Pinery - Lessons learned**

The Pinery bushfire started on 25 November 2015. It burnt in excess of 86,000 hectares, mostly in one day and led to the loss of two lives, 90 people hospitalised with five people critical. As well as the damage or destruction of 91 houses, 3388 other structures, 98 vehicles numerous pieces of farm machinery as well as the loss of 53,000 poultry and 17,500 head of livestock.

Project Pinery made a series of observations with key lessons for emergency management around improved coordination of incident management personnel, better systems for intelligence gathering and sharing and improving emergency management facilities.

#### **Gary Burns APM – January 2017**

#### **Review of the Extreme Weather Event 28 September 2016**

Gary Burns' review focussed on the emergency management response and made a series of recommendations towards improving operational procedures, communications and infrastructure.

Near-record rainfall events fell across southern and eastern Australia 2016, the impact of this rainfall across the Murray Darling Basin and surrounding regions was only overtaken in relatively recent times by the rainfall events over the winters of 1956 and 1974.

On 28 September 2016 the Bureau of Meteorology forecast severe weather conditions of extreme winds and supercells. The subsequent impact of these conditions had two significant effects; the first, was the subsequent damage caused to property, which included the destruction of high voltage transmission lines.

Burns' found that appropriate preparations, warnings and response personnel were activated in advance and during the event and noted emergency and government personnel worked effectively through the challenging conditions.

He also provided comment on the emergency management framework as laid out through the *Emergencies Act, 2004* and the State Emergency Management Plan. He commented that the *Emergencies Act* is not meeting its objectives (2017: xiii). Burns proposed a new structural framework and an assurance model to provide a point of focus for emergency management.

Burns also suggested this could be addressed by consolidating core components into SAFECOM and placing all components of emergency management under one responsible Minister, the Minister for Emergency Services.

The report also made a number of recommendations (2017:66) into emergency response including;

- Investigation of options to reduce the impact on the Adelaide COMCEN so that its focus can remain emergency 000 calls rather than non-life threatening situations which should flow through 132500 or to information lines (2017:64).
- Conducting a review of call receipt and dispatch services to remove duplication of systems and improved call prioritisation processes
- Improved resource tracking such automatic vehicle location systems be implemented.

The government response did not accept these recommendations as presented by Burns, noting these recommendations would require further consideration.

The review made a series of comments around gaps in the current committee structure created to meet the intent of the *Emergencies Act 2004*. Comment was also made on gaps in operationalising Agencies when events start to scale up and briefings need to be shared across agencies, NGOs and functional areas (2017:80).

Burns commented that the role and function of the EMC should be clarified under the SEMP so that Ministers and other persons undertaking leadership roles is clear (2017:87).

A number of recommendations also related to the requirement for improvements to control centres, ICT platforms for information management during emergencies and ongoing training and plans to support this infrastructure and systems.

### **System Black Event in South Australia – August 2019**

#### **Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC)**

The severe weather conditions of 28 September 2016 generated by extreme winds, tornadoes and supercells had two significant effects; the first, was the subsequent damage caused to property, which included the destruction of high voltage transmission lines.

The second effect was that operators of wind turbines ‘feathered’ their turbine blades, by changing the pitch of the windmill blades to prevent damage to the turbines.

The AEMC concluded these actions led to unintended consequences that is a culmination of events then occurred (2019:7).

1. Certain transmission infrastructure within the Electricity Grid was impacted; along with
2. An immediate loss of generation from Wind Farms within South Australia; led to
3. An immediate surge on the interconnector transmission line from Victoria, designed to supply SA when generation within SA is lower; the outcome of which was
4. The oversupply to the interconnector to beyond its capacity which led the interconnector to trip out; which resulted in
5. The Black system event at 3.48pm.

Power was gradually restored across the State with homes reconnected from within a few hours in most part of Adelaide through to several days in regional and more remote areas. The longer-term reconnections having serious economic impact on regional communities.

The AEMC, as the regulator is taking legal action against certain wind farm operators to ensure this limits a repeat of these circumstances. These actions taken by the AEMC to regulate operators will reduce the ongoing exposure to the community from wind generated electricity during similar severe weather events.

### **SA State Emergency Service – December 2016**

#### **State-wide extreme weather mitigation program - business case**

Following the 2016 events, the SA SES submitted a business case.

The business case outlines that under the SEMP, the SES is the designated hazard leader for extreme weather, assigning the SES with responsibility for a coordinated and consistent approach to planning for, mitigation and recovery from extreme weather events. (2016: 17).

The business case advocates the case for change, across observations of four problem areas;

- Limited resources for a coordinated state-wide approach to plan for and mitigate the impacts of extreme weather
- Limited capacity for continuous improvement in planning and delivery of evidence based programs to reduce the impact of severe weather.
- Variable capacity to coordinate emergency services and respond to impacts of extreme weather events.
- Diminishing capacity to recover and respond during sequential extreme weather events.

The paper provides extensive background and case studies of state-based and national extreme weather events over the previous ten or so years, including the September 2016 extreme weather event. However treating the consequences of the black system event as derived from the August 2019 AEMC report (see below) are not articulated in the SES business case.

The case for change is not supported by any significant data in terms of opportunities for mitigating life, property threats. It utilises information delivered from third party sources and with exception of some estimations of fatalities due to extreme heat in February 2009, does not seem to relate to the priorities around protection of life.

Ongoing investment into managing the risks and impacts of extreme weather is important, however this needs to align through SAFECOM's role in leading from a strategic perspective with respect to emergency management.

#### **AJL Solutions P/L – January 2017**

##### **SASES Severe Weather and Flooding September/October 2016 Debrief Report**

The debrief report reflected the observations from SES staff and other key personnel involved on the severe weather events of the spring of 2016. The review made observation about the inadequacy of the Emergency Management facilities, lack of key operational procedures, flood response plans and guidelines, lack of lessons learned processes and failures to implement previous recommendations.

The report also acknowledged the considerable range of success that could be attributed to the overall effort, noting significantly that no lives were lost that could be attributed to the severe weather or flooding (2017:17).

#### **SAFECOM Budget Analysis 2016, 2017, 2018**

These papers identify the baseline shortfalls and impacts of the 2012 budget decisions to cut SAFECOM's funding. SAFECOM had been attempting to maintain the similar levels of service of pre-2012, however it was recognised that this could only be successful by maintaining similar FTE levels. The paper sought an increase to SAFECOM baseline funding to maintain support services to the ESS, this was not successful despite the three separate attempts.

#### **Department of the Premier and Cabinet – November 2018**

##### **SAFECOM Review**

In September 2018, the Minister for Emergency Services approved a request from the Chief Executive, SAFECOM to trial a part time arrangement, working three days a week for six months.

On the 18 September 2018, following Chief Executive's request the Minister announced that the government would be undertaking a review of SAFECOM.

The Minister requested the Department of the Premier and Cabinet (DPC) review the role, function and operations of SAFECOM and identify the optimum arrangements for managing emergency services in South Australia.

#### **Select Committee on the Fire and Emergency Services (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill**

##### **– April 2019**

In 2018 the Government introduced an amendments Bill in to the South Australian Parliament to provide for a range of amendments based on a series of recommendations and reviews, the majority of which stemmed from the Holloway review of 2013. In December 2018 the House of Assembly referred the Bill to a select committee with the focus of inquiry to be on considerations to amend the *FES Act* to provide the

SACFS with additional powers to direct the cessation of harvesting or other actions, that due to weather conditions would cause a fire that is ignited under such conditions would get out of control.

The Select Committee recommended such powers should be delegated to SAPOL officers rather than CFS officers. The committee also made a range of observations with emphasis on concerns of a lack of consultation, the importance of relationships between the CFS and the farming community and limitations on communications which had led to a range of misconceptions as to the intent of the Bill.

# REPORT ON GOVERNMENT SERVICES 2019 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

A high-level analysis of Fire and Emergency Service budget allocation and performance targets has been undertaken by the Australian Government's Productivity Commission, titled 'Report on Government Services' (ROGS) Attachment D, Emergency Management.

ROGS has provided a clear benchmark of the efficiency and effectiveness in South Australia's Fire and Emergency Services, with South Australia holding a median position when compared to the performance and expenditure of other States and Territories.


## What is Emergency Management?

- ▶▶ *Aiming to reduce the risks of and the adverse effects from emergency events on individuals, communities and the environment. (ROGS Report 2019)*

The Emergency Service Agencies who provide these Emergency Management services within South Australia, are the Country Fire Service (CFS), Metropolitan Fire Service (MFS) and State Emergency Services (SES), and is governed by the South Australia Fire and Emergency Services Commission (SAFECOM). The CFS and MFS prepare for, prevent, respond to and assist recovery from fire and other events in regional and metropolitan areas, while the SES respond to a wide range of emergencies and rescues, particularly relating to extreme weather.

## ROGS Indicator Framework

- ▶▶ *The ROGS Performance Indicator Framework, as below, provides information on equity, efficiency and effectiveness, while distinguishing the outputs and outcomes of emergency services for fire events.*



The following tables provide an overview of Australia's expenditure, response times and preparedness levels regarding Emergency Management. All data featured in this document has been sourced from the Productivity Commission. Additional information, such as response times per geographic location and fire injury rates, can be found on the ROGS website by clicking [here](#). Note: most recent data for the measures below are not comparable across jurisdictions but are complete, subject to caveats.

#### GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES 2017-18 (\$ MILLION)

	NSW	VIC	QLD	WA	SA	TAS	ACT	NT	AUST
FIRE SERVICES	1103.4	1448.8	664.3	418.6	312.4	95.3	90.0	59.5	4192.2
STATE AND TERRITORY EMERGENCY SERVICES	108.3	64.8	19.3	NA	23.8	5.1	3.5	4.1	228.9
TOTAL	1211.7	1513.6	683.6	NA	336.3	100.3	93.5	63.6	4421.1

#### RESPONSE TIMES BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION STATEWIDE RESPONSE TIMES, AT 90TH PERCENTILE, 2017-18 (MINUTES)

	NSW	VIC	QLD	WA	SA	TAS	ACT	NT
INCLUDING CALL TAKING TIME	13.5	11.0	12.3	15.5	15.0	20.4	11.3	17.6
EXCLUDING CALL TAKING TIME	11.2	9.6	11.6	14.1	14.0	9.8	10.1	11.7

#### FIREFIGHTER WORKFORCE

	NSW	VIC	QLD	WA	SA	TAS	ACT	NT	AUST
WORKFORCE UNDER 50 YEARS OF AGE, 2017-18 (%)	64.3	63.4	59.6	67.0	58.0	65.5	62.3	77.6	63.2
WORKFORCE ATTRITION (NUMBER OF FTE EMPLOYEES WHO EXIT THE ORGANISATION AS A PROPORTION OF THE NUMBER OF FTE EMPLOYEES), 2017-18 (%)	1.2	4.0	3.4	4.0	2.9	2.7	6.3	5.3	3.8

#### PROPORTIONS OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH A SMOKE ALARM/DETECTOR, 2017-18

	NSW	VIC	QLD	WA	SA	TAS	ACT	NT	AUST
HOUSEHOLDS WITH A SMOKE ALARM/DETECTOR INSTALLED	95.6	97.2	97.1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
HOUSEHOLDS WITH AN OPERATIONAL/TESTED ALARM/DETECTOR (WITHIN LAST 12 MONTHS)	NA	NA	79.9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA



Government of South Australia  
South Australian Fire and  
Emergency Services Commission



## Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005

An Act to establish the South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission and to provide for the Commission's role in the governance, strategic and policy aspects of the emergency services sector; to provide for the continuation of a metropolitan fire and emergency service, a country fire and emergency service, and a State emergency service; to provide for the prevention, control and suppression of fires and for the handling of certain emergency situations; and for other purposes.

### Document Summary

The following document reinforces the significance of the South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission (SAFECOM) and how it's referred to in the above *Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005*.

It is worth noting the term Commission is used 108 times in the following document. This high number exemplifies the important role the Commission plays in the Emergency Services Sector, particularly ensuring the safety of the South Australian community.

#### **3—Interpretation**

***CE of the Commission*** means the person holding the office of Chief Executive of the Commission under Part 2 Division 4 and includes a person for the time being acting in that office;

#### **4—Establishment of areas for fire and emergency services**

- (1) The Commission may, by notice in the Gazette, establish a fire district or fire districts for the purposes of the operations of SAMFS.
- (2) The Commission may, by notice in the Gazette—
  - (a) vary the boundaries of a fire district;
  - (b) abolish a fire district.
- (3) Those parts of the State that lie outside a fire district will be taken to be the areas of the State that apply for the purposes of the operations of SACFS.

#### **4A—Areas of urban bushfire risk**

- (1) The Commission may, by notice in the Gazette, designate an area within a fire district as an area of urban bushfire risk (a ***designated urban bushfire risk area***).

### **Part 2—South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission**

#### **Division 1—Establishment of Commission**

#### **6—Establishment of Commission**

- (1) The *South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission* is established.
- (2) The Commission—
  - (a) is a body corporate; and
  - (b) has perpetual succession and a common seal; and
  - (c) is capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name; and
  - (d) has all the powers of a natural person that are capable of being exercised by a body corporate; and
  - (e) has the functions and powers assigned or conferred by or under this or any other Act.

(3) The Commission is an agency of the Crown and holds its property on behalf of the Crown.

**7 (1) Ministerial Control**, The Commission is subject to the control and direction of the Minister.

#### **8—Functions and powers of Commission**

**(1)** *The Commission has the following functions:*

- (a) to develop and maintain a strategic and policy framework across the emergency services sector;
- (b) to develop and implement a framework of sound corporate governance across the emergency services sector;
- (c) to ensure that appropriate strategic, administrative and other support services are provided to the emergency services organisations;
- (d) to ensure that appropriate strategic and business plans are developed, maintained and implemented across the emergency services sector;
- (e) to provide for the effective allocation of resources within the emergency services sector; (f) to ensure that the emergency services organisations have appropriate systems and practices in place—
  - (i) to provide for effective management and planning; and
  - (ii) to monitor management performance against plans and targets, and to take corrective action as necessary;
- (g) to ensure that the emergency services organisations maintain appropriate risk-management systems and practices;
- (h) to ensure that the emergency services organisations regularly review, and revise as necessary, their plans, structures, systems, targets and practices to address changing circumstances and to improve the provision of emergency services and business practices;
- (i) to ensure that the emergency services organisations meet their statutory responsibilities and comply with the provisions of this or any other relevant Act;
- (j) to ensure the observance of high ethical standards within the emergency services sector;
- (k) to foster and support career development opportunities for officers and staff within the emergency services sector;
- (l) to support and encourage voluntary participation in SACFS and SASES, and to foster and support personal development opportunities for members of the emergency services organisations;
- (m) to recognise outstanding achievements of persons who are involved in the provision of fire and emergency services, or who take action or assist at the scene of any fire or emergency or who otherwise support the objectives or activities of the emergency services sector (or any part of that sector), within any part of the State;
- (n) to ensure that there is effective consultation with the community in relation to the operation of this Act;
- (o) to disseminate knowledge in the field of fire and emergency services in order to advance community safety;
- (p) to undertake a leadership role from a strategic perspective with respect to emergency management within the State and to maintain an appropriate level of liaison with other bodies responsible for the management of emergencies in the State;
- (q) to provide regular reports to the Minister on the activities and performance of the emergency services sector;
- (r) to provide to the Minister reports or advice in relation to the operation of this Act or the provision of emergency services under this Act;
- (s) to perform any other function assigned to the Commission by or under this or any other Act.

(2) The Commission may, for the purpose of performing its functions, exercise any powers that are necessary or expedient for, or incidental to, the performance of its functions. **1.2.2010—Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005** South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission—Part 2 Functions and powers of Commission—Division 2 Published under the *Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002* 3

(3) The Commission must prepare a charter relating to its functions and operations.

(4) The Commission must provide a copy of the charter to the Minister and ensure that it is publicly available.

#### **9—Directions**

(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Commission may, in performing its functions, give directions to SAMFS, SACFS or SASES.

(2) The Commission may not give a direction in relation to any matter concerning the procedures that are relevant to responding to an emergency situation or to dealing with any matter that may arise at the scene of an emergency.

**11- Board** means the board established as the governing body of the Commission, the **CE of the Commission** is the presiding member.

#### **16- CE of the Commission**

(1) The office of Chief Executive (CE) of the Commission is established.

(2) The CE—

(a) unless otherwise determined by the Minister, must be a person with experience in the provision of fire or emergency services; and

(b) will be appointed by the Minister on conditions determined by the Minister for a term, not exceeding 5 years, specified in the instrument of appointment (and, at the expiration of a term of appointment, is eligible for reappointment).

(3) The CE is responsible for—

(a) managing the staff and resources of the Commission; and

(b) giving effect to the policies and decisions of the Board; and

(c) undertaking other executive management roles associated with the activities of the Commission; and

(d) performing other functions assigned to the CE by the Board.

(4) The Minister may, while the CE is absent from the duties of office or while the position of CE is temporarily vacant, appoint a person to act in the office of CE (on conditions determined by the Minister).

(5) A person appointed under subsection (4) will not act as a deputy member of the Board unless specifically appointed as a deputy of the CE under section 11(3).

#### **17—Staff**

(1) The staff of the Commission will comprise—

(a) persons appointed by the Chief Executive of the Commission on terms and conditions determined by the Chief Executive and approved by the Commissioner for Public Sector Employment (on the basis that the Chief Executive (and any successor) is the employer);

(b) persons employed in a public sector agency and made available to assist the Commission.

(2) The Commission is responsible for any costs or expenses associated with the employment of a person under subsection (1)(a).

#### **17A—Workforce plans**

For the purposes of appointments to the staff of the Commission under this Division means the person holding the office of Chief Executive of the Commission. The CE is responsible for—

(a) managing the staff and resources of the Commission; and

(b) giving effect to the policies and decisions of the Board; and

- (c) undertaking other executive management roles associated with the activities of the Commission;
- (d) performing other functions assigned to the CE by the Board.

### **27—Chief Officer**

- (1) The office of Chief Officer of SAMFS is established (and a reference in this Part to the "Chief Officer" will be a reference to the Chief Officer of SAMFS).
- (2) The Chief Officer will be appointed by the Minister after taking into account the recommendation of the CE of the Commission.
- (3) The Chief Officer will be appointed on terms and conditions determined by the Minister after consultation with the Commissioner for Public Sector Employment.
- (4) In addition to the Chief Officer's responsibility for the management and administration of SAMFS, the Chief Officer has ultimate responsibility for the operations of SAMFS and may therefore—
  - (a) control all resources of SAMFS; and
  - (b) manage the staff of SAMFS and give directions to its members; and
  - (c) assume control of any SAMFS operations; and
  - (d) perform any other function or exercise any other power that may be conferred by or under this or any other Act, or that may be necessary or expedient for, or incidental to, maintaining, improving or supporting the operation of SAMFS.

### **28—Deputy Chief Officer and Assistant Chief Officers**

- (1) The Chief Officer may appoint a Deputy Chief Officer and 1 or more Assistant Chief Officers (on the basis that the Chief Officer (and any successor) is the employer).
- (2) The terms and conditions of an appointment under this section will be subject to the approval of the Commissioner for Public Sector Employment after consultation with the Chief Officer and the Commission.

### **32—Workforce plans**

For the purposes of appointments to the staff of SAMFS under this Division—

- (a) the Chief Officer must, at least once in every year, submit a workforce plan for approval by the Commission; and
- (b) the Commission may approve a workforce plan submitted by the Chief Officer without amendment, or with any amendments determined by the Commission after consultation with the Chief Officer; and
- (c) the Chief Officer must not make an appointment under this Division unless it accords with the workforce plan last approved by the Commission.

### **53—Annual reports**

- (1) SAMFS must, on or before 30 September in each year, deliver to the Commission a report on the activities of SAMFS during the preceding financial year (and need not provide a report under the *Public Sector Act 2009*).
- (2) The report must—
  - (a) include the audited statements of account required under this Division; and
  - (b) include any other information that would be required if SAMFS were reporting under the *Public Sector Act 2009*; and
  - (c) comply with any other requirements prescribed by or under this Act or the regulations.

#### **58A—Parliamentary recognition of SACFS Volunteer Charter**

(1) The Parliament recognises that SACFS is first and foremost a volunteer-based organisation, in which volunteer officers and members are supported by employees in a fully integrated manner.

(2) The Parliament recognises that the SACFS Volunteer Charter—

(a) is a statement of the commitment and principles that apply to the relationship between the Government of South Australia, the Commission, SACFS and volunteer officers and members; and

(b) requires that the Government of South Australia, the Commission and SACFS recognise, value, respect and promote the contribution of volunteer officers and members to the well-being and safety of the community; and

(c) requires that the Government of South Australia, the Commission and SACFS commit to consulting with the Country Fire Service Volunteers Association on behalf of volunteer officers and members on any matter that might reasonably be expected to affect them.

(3) SACFS must, in performing its functions, have regard to the commitments and principles set out in the SACFS Volunteer Charter.

(4) SACFS has a responsibility to develop policy and organisational arrangements that encourage, maintain and strengthen the capacity of volunteer officers and members to provide SACFS services.

(5) In this section—

**SACFS Volunteer Charter** means the SACFS Volunteer Charter prepared in consultation with the Government of South Australia, the Commission, SACFS, the Country Fire Service Volunteers Association and SACFS volunteers, as in force from time to time.

#### **60—Chief Officer**

(1) The office of Chief Officer of SACFS is established (and a reference in this Part to the "Chief Officer" will be a reference to the Chief Officer of SACFS).

(2) The Chief Officer will be appointed by the Minister after taking into account the recommendation of the CE of the Commission.

(3) The Chief Officer will be appointed on terms and conditions determined by the Minister after consultation with the Commissioner for Public Sector Employment.

(4) In addition to the Chief Officer's responsibility for the management and administration of SACFS, the Chief Officer has ultimate responsibility for the operations of SACFS and may therefore—

(a) control all resources of SACFS; and

(b) manage the staff of SACFS and give directions to its members; and

(c) assume control of any SACFS operations; and

(d) perform any other function or exercise any other power that may be conferred by or under this or any other Act, or that may be necessary or expedient for, or incidental to, maintaining, improving or supporting the operation of SACFS.

#### **61—Deputy Chief Officer and Assistant Chief Officers**

(1) The Chief Officer may appoint a Deputy Chief Officer and 1 or more Assistant Chief Officers (on the basis that the Chief Officer (and any successor) is the employer).

(2) The terms and conditions of an appointment under this section will be subject to the approval of the Commissioner for Public Sector Employment after consultation with the Chief Officer and the Commission.

(3) The Deputy Chief Officer (if appointed) or, if necessary, an Assistant Chief Officer designated by the Minister, may, while the Chief Officer is absent from the duties of office or while the position of Chief Officer is temporarily vacant, perform and exercise the functions and powers of the Chief Officer (but not so as to act as a deputy member of the Board unless specifically appointed as deputy of the Chief Officer under section 11(3)).

### **62—Other officers**

(1) SACFS will have such other officers (other than officers who hold office as volunteer members of SACFS organisations) as the Chief Officer thinks fit to appoint (on the basis that the Chief Officer (and any successor) is the employer).

(2) An appointment under this section will be on terms and conditions determined by the Chief Officer and approved by the Commission (subject to the provisions of any award or industrial agreement).

### **63—Employees**

(1) The Chief Officer may appoint other persons as employees of SACFS (on the basis that the Chief Officer (and any successor) is the employer).

(2) An appointment under this section will be on terms and conditions determined by the Chief Officer and approved by the Commission (subject to the provisions of any award or industrial agreement).

### **65—Workforce plans**

For the purposes of appointments to the staff of SACFS under this Division—

(a) the Chief Officer must, at least once in every year, submit a workforce plan for approval by the Commission; and

(b) the Commission may approve a workforce plan submitted by the Chief Officer without amendment, or with any amendments determined by the Commission after consultation with the Chief Officer; and

(c) the Chief Officer must not make an appointment under this Division unless it accords with the workforce plan last approved by the Commission.

### **71F—Specific reports**

(1) The Minister or the Commission may, by written notice to the State Bushfire Coordination Committee, require the State Bushfire Coordination Committee to provide to the Minister or the Commission, within a period stated in the notice or at stated intervals, any report or reports relating to the performance, exercise or discharge of any aspect of its functions, powers or responsibilities, as the Minister or the Commission (as the case may be) thinks fit.

(2) If a requirement is imposed under subsection (1), the State Bushfire Coordination Committee must cause a statement of the fact of the imposition of the requirement to be published in its next annual report.

### **101—Annual reports**

(1) SACFS must, on or before 30 September in each year, deliver to the Commission a report on the activities of SACFS during the preceding financial year (and need not provide a report under the *Public Sector Act 2009*).

(2) The report must—

(a) include the audited statements of account required under this Division; and

(ab) incorporate the annual report on the activities of the State Bushfire Coordination Committee and the bushfire management committees for the relevant financial year; and

(b) include any other information that would be required if SACFS were reporting under the *Public Sector Act 2009*; and

(c) comply with any other requirements prescribed by or under this Act or the regulations.

### **105E—Reports**

The Commission, the State Bushfire Coordination Committee or a bushfire management committee in whose bushfire management area the relevant council area is wholly or partly located may, by written

notice, require the council to provide to the Commission, the State Bushfire Coordination Committee or the bushfire management committee (within a period stated in the notice or at stated intervals) any report or reports relating to the performance, exercise or discharge of the functions, powers or responsibilities of the fire prevention officer or officers (if any) for the council's area, as the Commission, the State Bushfire Coordination Committee or the bushfire management committee (as the case may be) thinks fit.

#### **107A—Parliamentary recognition of SASES Volunteer Charter**

(1) The Parliament recognises that SASES is first and foremost a volunteer-based organisation, in which volunteer officers and members are supported by employees in a fully integrated manner.

(2) The Parliament recognises that the SASES Volunteer Charter—

(a) is a statement of the commitment and principles that apply to the relationship between the Government of South Australia, the Commission, SASES and volunteer officers and members; and

(b) requires that the Government of South Australia, the Commission and SASES recognise, value, respect and promote the contribution of volunteer officers and members to the well-being and safety of the community; and

(c) requires that the Government of South Australia, the Commission and SASES commit to consulting with the South Australian State Emergency Service Volunteers Association on behalf of volunteer officers and members on any matter that might reasonably be expected to affect them.

(3) SASES must, in performing its functions, have regard to the commitments and principles set out in the SASES Volunteer Charter.

(4) SASES has a responsibility to develop policy and organisational arrangements that encourage, maintain and strengthen the capacity of volunteer officers and members to provide SASES services.

(5) In this section—

**SASES Volunteer Charter** means the SASES Volunteer Charter prepared in consultation with the Government of South Australia, the Commission, SASES, the South Australian State Emergency Service Volunteers Association and SASES volunteers, as in force from time to time.

### **Division 3—Chief Officer and staff**

#### **109—Chief Officer**

(1) The office of Chief Officer of SASES is established (and a reference in this Part to the "Chief Officer" will be a reference to the Chief Officer of SASES).

(2) The Chief Officer will be appointed by the Minister after taking into account the recommendation of the CE of the Commission.

(3) The Chief Officer will be appointed on terms and conditions determined by the Minister after consultation with the Commissioner for Public Sector Employment.

(4) In addition to the Chief Officer's responsibility for the management and administration of SASES, the Chief Officer has ultimate responsibility for the operations of SASES and may therefore—

(a) control all resources of SASES; and

(b) manage the staff of SASES and give directions to its members; and

(c) assume control of any SASES operations; and

(d) perform any other function or exercise any other power that may be conferred by or under this or any other Act, or that may be necessary or expedient for, or incidental to, maintaining, improving or supporting the operation of SASES.

### **110—Deputy Chief Officer and Assistant Chief Officers**

- (1) The Chief Officer may appoint a Deputy Chief Officer and 1 or more Assistant Chief Officers (on the basis that the Chief Officer (and any successor) is the employer).
- (2) The terms and conditions of an appointment under this section will be subject to the approval of the Commissioner for Public Sector Employment after consultation with the Chief Officer and the Commission.
- (3) The Deputy Chief Officer (if appointed) or, if necessary, an Assistant Chief Officer designated by the Minister, may, while the Chief Officer is absent from the duties of office or while the position of Chief Officer is temporarily vacant, perform and exercise the functions and powers of the Chief Officer (but not so as to act as a deputy member of the Board unless specifically appointed as deputy of the Chief Officer under section 11(3)).

### **111—Other officers**

- (1) SASES will have such other officers (other than officers who hold office as volunteer members of SASES units) as the Chief Officer thinks fit to appoint (on the basis that the Chief Officer (and any successor) is the employer).
- (2) An appointment under this section will be on terms and conditions determined by the Chief Officer and approved by the Commission (subject to the provisions of any award or industrial agreement).
- (3) Nothing in this section limits the ability of the Chief Officer to appoint a suitable person to act in an office or position while the person appointed to that office or position is absent or temporarily unable to act in that office or position, or while that office or position is temporarily vacant.

### **112—Employees**

- (1) The Chief Officer may appoint other persons as employees of SASES (on the basis that the Chief Officer (and any successor) is the employer).
- (2) An appointment under this section will be on terms and conditions determined by the Chief Officer and approved by the Commission (subject to the provisions of any award or industrial agreement).

### **113—Staff**

- (1) The staff of SASES will comprise all officers (being officers appointed to the staff of SASES rather than being volunteer members of SASES units) and other employees of SASES.
- (2) A member of the staff of SASES must comply with a direction of—
  - (a) the Chief Officer; or
  - (b) an officer—
    - (i) to whom the member of staff is responsible by virtue of this Act; or
    - (ii) who is in a position of authority over the member of staff by virtue of a determination of the Chief Officer.
- (3) In addition, SASES may make use of persons employed in any public sector agency made available to assist SASES.
- (4) SASES is responsible for any costs or expenses associated with the employment of a member of the staff of SASES.



#### 114—Workforce plans

For the purposes of appointments to the staff of SASES under this Division—

- (a) the Chief Officer must, at least once in every year, submit a workforce plan for approval by the Commission; and
- (b) the Commission may approve a workforce plan submitted by the Chief Officer without amendment, or with any amendments determined by the Commission after consultation with the Chief Officer; and
- (c) the Chief Officer must not make an appointment under this Division unless it accords with the workforce plan last approved by the Commission.

#### 121—Annual reports

- (1) SASES must, on or before 30 September in each year, deliver to the Commission a report on the activities of SASES during the preceding financial year (and need not provide a report under the *Public Sector Act 2009*).

### Part 6—Miscellaneous

#### 124—Investigations

(1) An authorised officer may, with or without assistance—

- (a) enter and inspect any land, building, structure, vehicle or other place for the purpose of determining the cause of a fire or other emergency;
- (b) take possession of any land, building, structure, vehicle or other thing for the purpose of any investigation or inquiry into the cause of a fire or other emergency;
- (c) remove any object, material or other thing that may tend to establish the cause of a fire or other emergency;
- (d) retain possession of any object, material or other thing for the purpose of any investigation or inquiry into the cause of a fire or other emergency.

(2) In this section—

**authorised officer** means—

- (a) an officer or other member of an emergency services organisation, authorised by the Chief Officer of the emergency services organisation to act as an authorised officer under this section; or
- (b) a police officer; or
- (c) some other person authorised by the Commission to act as an authorised officer under this section.

#### 127—Protection from liability

(1) No civil or criminal liability will attach to a member of an emergency services organisation, a person appointed or authorised to act under this Act by the Commission, or other person for an honest act or omission—

- (a) in the exercise or discharge, or purported exercise or discharge, of a power or function under this Act; or
- (b) in the carrying out of any direction or requirement given or imposed at the scene of a fire or other emergency.

(2) A liability that would, but for subsection (1), lie against a person lies instead against the Crown.

(3) A person (the **injured person**) who suffers injury, loss or damage as a result of the act or omission of a member of an emergency services organisation who is a volunteer may not sue the member personally unless—

- (a) it is clear from the circumstances of the case that the immunity conferred by subsection (1) does not extend to the case; or

(b) the injured person brings an action in the first instance against the Crown but the Crown then disputes, in a defence filed to the action, that it is liable for the act or omission of the member.

(4) Without limiting subsection (1), no liability attaches to SACFS, the State Bushfire Coordination Committee, a bushfire management committee or a council (or the members of any of them) by virtue of the fact that a bushfire prevention plan—

(a) has not been prepared under this Act in relation to a particular part of this State; or

(b) has been so prepared but has not been implemented, or fully implemented.

### 131—Protection of names and logos

(1) In this section—

**official insignia** means—

- (a) any logo declared by the Commission by notice in the Gazette to be a logo for the purposes of this section; and
- (b) any of the following (whether appearing or used in full or in an abbreviated form or alone or in combination with other words or symbols):
- (i) "South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission", "SAFECOM" and "SAFESC";
- (ii) "South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service", "SAMFS" or "MFS";
- (iii) "South Australian Country Fire Service", "SACFS" or "CFS";
- (iv) "South Australian State Emergency Service", "SASES" or "SES";
- (v) any other name, title or expression declared by the Commission by notice in the Gazette to be an official title for the purposes of this section; and
- (c) any combination of a logo under paragraph (a) and a name, title or expression under paragraph (b).

(2) The Commission must not make a declaration under subsection (1) without the consent of the Minister.

(3) A person must not, without the consent of the Commission, assume a name or description that consists of, or includes, official insignia.

Maximum penalty: \$10 000.

(4) A consent under this section—

- (a) may be given with or without conditions (including conditions requiring payment to the Commission);
- (b) may be given generally by notice in the Gazette or by notice in writing addressed to an applicant for the consent;
- (c) may be revoked by the Commission for breach of a condition, or for any other reasonable cause, by notice in writing given personally or by post to a person who has the benefit of the consent.
- (5) The Supreme Court may, on the application of the Commission, grant an injunction to restrain a breach of this section.

(6) The court by which a person is convicted of an offence against this section may, on the application of the Commission—

- (a) order the convicted person to pay compensation of an amount fixed by the court to the Commission;
- (b) order the convicted person to surrender any item that bears any official insignia to the Commission.
- (7) Subsections (5) and (6) do not derogate from any civil remedy that may be available to the Commission, or any emergency services organisation, apart from those subsections.

### 133—Disclosure of information

(1) A member of an emergency services organisation, a fire prevention officer, a fire control officer, a police officer or an authorised officer may direct a person who he or she reasonably suspects has committed, is committing or is about to commit, an offence against this Act to state the person's full name and usual place of residence and to produce evidence of the person's identity.

(2) A person to whom a direction is given under subsection (1) must immediately comply with the direction.

Maximum penalty: \$5 000.

(3) In this section—

**authorised officer** means a person authorised by the Commission (either personally or by the designation of a class of persons) to exercise the powers of an authorised officer under this section.

#### **134—Unauthorised fire brigades**

(1) A person must not, without the approval of the Commission or the Chief Officer of SACFS, be a member of a fire brigade in the country that is not an SACFS organisation.

Maximum penalty: \$1 250.

(2) In this section—

**fire brigade** means a group of people equipped to deal with fires on behalf of a local community.

#### **138—Offences by body corporate**

(1) If a body corporate is guilty of an offence against this Act (other than an offence against the regulations), each director and the manager of the body corporate are guilty of an offence and liable to the same penalty as is prescribed for the principal offence when committed by a natural person if the prosecution proves that—

(a) the director or manager (as the case may be) knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that there was a significant risk that such an offence would be committed; and

(b) the director or manager (as the case may be) was in a position to influence the conduct of the body corporate in relation to the commission of such an offence; and

(c) the director or manager (as the case may be) failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the principal offence is an offence against section 40, 79, 87, 89, 91, 125, 126, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136 or 142.

(3) A person may be prosecuted and convicted of an offence under this section whether or not the body corporate has been prosecuted or convicted of the offence committed by the body corporate.

#### **146—Recognised interstate organisations**

(1) A member of a recognised interstate organisation who is present at the scene of a fire or other emergency in this State may, if there is no officer of an emergency services organisation in control of operations to deal with the fire or other emergency, exercise any power vested in an officer of an emergency services organisation under this Act.

(2) In this section—

**recognised interstate organisation** means an organisation formed outside this State and declared by the Commission or a Chief Officer of an emergency services organisation, by notice published in the Gazette, to be a recognised interstate organisation.

#### **147—Inquests**

(1) The Commission or any emergency services organisation is entitled to be heard at any inquest into the causes of a fire or other emergency and may be represented at the inquest by counsel or by one of its officers.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an officer of the Commission will be a person designated as an officer by the Commission.

## Schedule 5—Regulations

13 The holding of coronial inquests at the request of the Commission or an emergency services organisation in prescribed cases.

## **POLICY INITIATIVES AND BUDGET ENHANCEMENTS SINCE MARCH 2018**

### **VOLUNTEER CHARTERS**

The *FES (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill 2018* was passed parliament on 31 July 2019 and the *Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005* was updated on 8 August 2019.

Key objectives of the bill is to improve the ability of the emergency services to deliver public safety outcomes, at minimal cost to the government and community and to demonstrate the government's commitment and appreciation of emergency services volunteers to the safety of the South Australian community.

The Volunteer Charters represent a commitment by the Government to consult with the CFS and SES volunteer associations and CFS and SES volunteers about matters that might affect them.

### **2018-19 AND 2019-20 FUNDING TO VOLUNTEER ASSOCIATIONS**

In 2018-19 Volunteer associations were provided with the following funding (ex-GST):

- CFSVA : \$388,750 (\$261,750 based funding, \$100,000 for volunteers insurance and \$27,000 for review of CFSVA policy and strategic direction)
- SESVA: \$85,849 (\$79,056 operating funding and \$6,793 for volunteers insurance)

In 2019-20 Volunteer associations are to be provided with the following funding (ex-GST):

- CFSVA : \$388,750 (\$361,750 based funding and \$27,000 for review of CFSVA policy and strategic direction)
- SESVA: \$87,960 (\$81,000 operating funding and \$6,960 for volunteers insurance)

### **2019-20 FUNDING TO NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS**

In 2019-20, grants to Volunteer Marine Rescue (VMR), Surf Life Saving (SLS) and payments for shark beach patrol are budgeted to be:

- VMR associations: \$1.2 million (\$0.7 million operating and \$0.5 million capital)
- Surf Life Saving SA: \$3.9 million (\$0.7 million operating; \$0.105 million FMP support and \$3.1 million club redevelopment)
- Shark patrol: \$0.4 million

### **REDUCTION OF ANNUAL ESL BILLS BY \$90 MILLION A YEAR**

In the 2014-15 State Budget the Government removed the fixed property Emergency Services Levy (ESL) remission (better known as the "General Remission") on all properties except principal places of residence owned by eligible pensioners and concession card holders.

- In 2018-19, the Remission was reinstated by the Marshall Government.
- In the 2019-20 State Budget, fixed property remissions have been budgeted to be \$118.124 million.
- Volunteers have welcomed the remissions, particularly those on the land.

### **NEW HEADQUARTERS FOR CFS, SES AND SAFECOM**

The 2018-19 Budget provided for the costs in relation to new Head Quarters for CFE, SES and SAFECOM. Total cost of the project is \$14.2 million with an expected completion date of December 2022.

### **2019-20 BUDGET MEASURES**

\$1.6 million in 2019-20 to the SA Metropolitan Fire Service (SAMFS) to support with medical testing of firefighters and remediation of appliances and sites having had exposure to Per and Poly-fluoroalkyl substances which are a man-made chemical found in firefighting foam. Testing to identify possible contamination includes blood test for serving and retired MFS firefighters, sample of testing water, air, soil, dust, crops, livestock grown on stations and discharge points on the appliances.

\$0.9 million in 2019-20 (\$4.3 million over four years) to the SA Metropolitan Fire Service (SAMFS) for Protective Firefighting Equipment to equip additional 50 operational FTEs received through the 2017 Enterprise Agreement. This initiative has two components:

- purchase of 500 new Breathing Apparatus over three years
- purchase of 1,100 new helmets over two years

\$1.1 million per annum to Country Fire Service (CFS) to ensure compliance with national heavy vehicle chain of responsibility laws. Under these laws heavy vehicles (over 4 tonne) need to meet required vehicle standards. CFS has the largest heavy vehicle fleet within the South Australia Government with approximately 1 000 CFS vehicles within the scope of these laws.

\$0.2 million in 2019-20 (\$0.2 million per annum) to State Emergency Service (SES) for facilities and maintenance upgrades of State Emergency Service Units. Depending on the units, the maintenance and upgrades would include provision of onsite ablution blocks, change room facilities, additional storage sheds.

### **2018-19 BUDGET MEASURES**

The 2018-19 Budget included \$8.2 million for new measures in 2018-19 across the emergency services sector.

#### **ALERT SA**

\$2.6 million in 2018-19 (\$5.2 million over four years) to SAFECOM for replacement of Alert SA through:

- investment in a new technical solution to deliver a reliable public safety and warning service from the state's emergency services organisations; and
- ongoing funding to cover operational costs including employment of two staff.
- new website, iOS app and android app have been completed and undergoing user acceptance testing.

#### **CFS STATION UPGRADES**

\$2.5 million in 2018-19 (\$5.0 million over two years) to CFS to support station upgrades through upgrading existing stations, incident control centres, ancillary buildings and increased backup power generation capacity.

### **NATIONAL AERIAL FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGY**

\$2.3 million in 2018-19 (\$9.5 million over four years) to CFS to continue South Australia's involvement with the National Aerial Firefighting Strategy including:

- access to a dedicated aerial firefighting fleet and resources shared between states and territories; and
- increasing the size of the South Australian fleet from 18 to 26 aircraft; and
- the establishment of a new base in the Mid North where planes will be placed on standby to respond to fires in the region and nearby areas alleviating the need to redirect planes from the Adelaide Hills base.

### **ALUMINIUM CLADDING COMPLIANCE**

\$0.3 million in 2018-19 (\$0.6 million over two years) to MFS for aluminium cladding and building code compliance through:

- participation in the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure audit of government and private buildings; and
- to oversee the conformance and compliance with Australian building codes and national standards, particularly in relation to the use of aluminium cladding through employment of 2 staff.

### **SHARK SPOTTING DRONES**

\$0.2 million in 2018-19 to SAFECOM for shark spotting drones for surf lifesaving clubs.

### **SES HUMANIHUT**

\$0.2 million in 2018-19 (\$0.7 million over four years) to SES for ongoing operation of a portable Humanihut basecamp shelter solution to be deployed for use during emergencies such as bushfires or floods.

### **EQUIPMENT GRANTS FOR SLS CLUBS**

\$0.1 million in 2018-19 (\$0.4 million over four years) for equipment grants to each of the 22 surf lifesaving clubs in South Australia.

### **MOUNT BARKER EMERGENCY SERVICES**

This initiative provides \$697 000 per annum (indexed) from 2019–20 for the recruitment and remuneration of retained officers, and \$1.75 million in 2020–21 for two new firefighting appliances, to enable the Metropolitan Fire Service (MFS) to implement a retained staffed fire station in Mount Barker. The MFS has identified that the growth profile and changing demographic of Mount Barker toward a more urbanised environment requiring an MFS firefighting presence. The MFS will utilise a retained fire station model, which operates by having firefighters on call within the region to respond to emergencies as needed.

### **OTHER GRANTS**

The 2018-19 Budget provided approximately \$7.5 million in Natural Disaster Resilience Programs Grants and Prepared Community Grants.

